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Chapter I
Introduction
Recently, the issue of corporate governance has caught much more attention from companies and
investors, to government authorities, organizations and securities exchanges across countries.
There are several reasons for this attentiveness. One is the recent proliferation of corporate and
accounting scandals aroused around the world. And the other is as a research indicates: better
corporate governance frameworks would benefit firms through greater access to financing, lower
cost of capital, better firm performance, and more favorable treatment of all stakeholders. 1 And
this gives corporations great incentives to establish and maintain good mechanism of corporate
governance structure for business operation.

Generally, the U.S. corporate governance structure in large public companies, which is based on
the separation of corporate control 2 and ownership 3 and derived from an independent and
objective manager-overseeing responsibility of the board of directors, is deemed as a good model
of corporate governa nce for foreign countries and companies to follow. It is also deemed a
better way to develop a sound corporate governance system and to maximize shareholders’
wealth.

1

See Stijn Claessens, Corporate Governance and Development, Global Corporate Governance Forum, 2003,
available at
http://www.gcgf.org/library/Discussion_Papers_and_Focus%20Notes/Focus_1_Corp_Governance_and_Developme
nt.pdf.
2
See Am. L. Inst., Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 1.27. “Corporation
control” refers to the active executive management of the corporation.
3
Id. “Corporation’s ownership” refers to its shareholders.

1

However, the recent high-profile corporate and accounting scandals that have erupted in the U.S.,
such as Enron, WorldCom, and other companies, have shaken investors’ confidences in the U.S.
securities markets. These breaches of trust, failures of responsibility, breakdowns in governance,
and lack of candid disclosure of directors, officers and corporations seriously undermine the
corporate governance structure in the U.S. They also imperil the basic structure of corporate
capitalism, which is that investors entrust their assets to management while boards of directors
oversee management so that the potential for conflict of interest between owners and managers is
minimized. 4 Since these scandals, there is a renewed attention and reflection to amend the
corporate governance regulatory scheme in the U.S.

Facing such financial fraud s and trying to restore investors’ confidence led Congress to rapidly
pass the renowned Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“S-O Act”) 5 , which was promptly signed by the
President. 6 The S-O Act is one of the most significant federal corporate and securities legislation
concerning the U.S. corporate governance structure in recent years. One of the main goals of the
S-O Act is to improve investors’ confidence in the financial integrity of the public companies in
the U.S., which in turn will promote confidence in the markets for these companies’ securities.
In response to the directive provided by the S-O Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) has undertaken rulemaking in a number of areas. Furthermore, the SEC has requested
that the self- regulatory organizations (“SRO”) revise and tighten their listing requirements.
Hence, the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (“NYSE”) and the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc (“NASD”) through its subsidiary, the Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. ("Nasdaq") filed
4

See Peter Jarrett, the United States Corporate Governance: the Market as Monitor, the OECD Observer, No. 203
(1997), available at http://www1.oecd.org/publications/observer/203/037-039a.pdf.
5
The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), Pub.
L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat (2002).
6
S-O Act was passed by Congress on July 25, 2002, and signed by the President the following weeks.
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with the SEC to amend their listing rules to meet the new requirements of the S-O Act and the
SEC rules to decrease the potential for future financial failures.

However, some requirements of the new legislation have already been implemented by public
companies before the enactment of new legislation.

7

For example, most large public

corporations now already had a majority of independent directors on the board and had audit
committees composed primarily of independent directors. 8

Enron and WorldCom are no

exception. In fact, Enron seems to have a model board in that respect, since only two of its
fourteen directors are insiders. 9 Nevertheless, it is still hypothesized under new legislation that
the independence of the board is the best means to minimize the risk of future financial
misstatements and accounting frauds. Thus, the independence and oversight function of board of
directors is emphasized.

This major regulatory transition of the U.S. corporate governance regulations has already made a
great impact on U.S. public companies, which have complained about the increasing costs of
complying with the new corporate governance regulations 10 and the greater difficulties in

7

See e.g. Statement of the New York Stock Exchange on Audit Committee Policy (Jan. 6, 1977). NYSE added a
requirement, approved by the SEC, that as of June 30, 1978 each domestic company listed on the NYSE must
establish and maintain "an audit committee comprised solely of directors independent of management and free from
any relationship that, in the opinion of the board of directors, would interfere with its exercise of independent
judgment as a committee member."
8
See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm
Performance, 54 Bus. Law. 921, 922 (1999)
9
A number of studies show that firms with a majority of independent directors do not perform any better than firms
without such boards, and the firms with only one or two inside directors may actually perform worse. See Bhagat &
Black, supra note 8, at 923; James P. Walsh & James K. Seward, On the Efficiency of Internal and External
Corporate Control Mechanism, 15 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 421, 434 (1990)
10
See Deborah Solomon and Cassell Bryan-Low, Companies Complain about Cost of Corporate-Governance Rules,
Wall St. J. February 10, 2004, at A1. A survey of 321 companies shows that businesses with more than $5 billion in
revenue expect to spend an average of $4.7 million each implementing Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 this year, according to Financial Executives International, which represents top corporate officers. Much of
the money is being spent on consultants, lawyers, auditors, and new software.
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locating qualified outside directors due to the increased responsibilities and potential liability of
directors, more stringent definitions of “independence” and “financial expert”, as well as greater
time commitment demanded for directors. 11

It also catches significant attention from foreign

countries. Since the U.S. is one of the biggest capital markets in the world, not only has its
corporate governance system been partly followed by many countries and securities exchanges,
but there are also many foreign companies listed on the U.S. national securities exchanges. In
this manner, although corporate governance structure is based on different legal systems and
historical contexts from country to country,

12

recent amendments of the U.S. corporate

governance regulations still have a very significant impact on foreign countries.

Moreover, with globalization, internationalization of securities and finance markets, and the
stronger influence of institutional investors nowadays, cross-border investment has been
increasing and is more common. Most countries relying on foreign investments and finance
would orient their corporate governance system to the international main stream, which now is
the U.S. shareholder-centered corporate governance system and to amend their corporate
governance legal frameworks. By accommodating the U.S. corporate governance system, it is
more favorable for foreign companies to raise capital by cross issuing securities or cross listing
on U.S. and their home countries’ securities markets. And by entering into the U.S. securities
market, it will also increase the reliability and confidence of both institutional and individual
investors.

We can find this fact in Taiwan’s latest revision of corporate law in 2001. The

11

See Kemba J. Dunham, Reforms Turn Search for Directors Into a Long, Tedious Task, Wall St. J. August 29,
2002, at B1 (one CEO says a director search that used to take 3 to 8 months now may take 12 to 18 months).
12
There is a two-tier board structure, which includes board of directors and supervisory board found in some
countries, especially when their legal system is transplanted from European continent.
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revision is to some extent an accommodation of the U.S. corporate governance system into their
legal system.

In the following sections, Part II first talks about the background of corporate governance. Part
III indicates the main topic of this thesis, the latest amendment of corporate governance
regulatory scheme in the United States, mainly the S-O Act, SEC Rules and the NYSE and
Nasdaq listing rules. Part IV presents the latest transition of corporate governance in Taiwan.
Part V discusses how the latest development of the regulatory scheme of corporate governance in
the United States might impact foreign private issuers listed on the NYSE and Nasdaq. Finally,
Part VI is the conclusion of the thesis.

5

Chapter II
Corporate Governance
The term “corporate governance” first appears to have arisen and entered into prominent usage in
the mid-to- late 1970s in the U.S. in the wake of the Watergate scandal, the discovery that major
American corporations had engaged in secret political contributions at home and corrupt
payments abroad. 13 There are a wide variety of definitions for the term “corporate governance”.
Simply put, “corporate governance” is a framework set by law and regulations of jurisdictions,
by stock exchanges, and by companies’ interior charters and by- laws. This framework is a
process, not a state, which would continue evolving in its shape and contents over time
throughout social and economic developments. Since “corporate governance” is a framework set
by laws and regulations of different jurisdictions, it is naturally different from country to country,
and owes much to different history and cultural backgrounds of the region. Despite its rather
fashionable use in the modern times, a detailed and unified definition of the globally accepted
term “corporate governance” does not exist.

There are also different definitions of “corporate governance” in different domains. Economists
and social scientists have a broader definition of “corporate governance” as "the institutions that
influence how business corporations allocate resources and returns"14 and "the organizations and
rules that affect expectatio ns about the exercise of control of resources in firms."15
Legal academics, however, tend to develop a narrower definition of corporate governance.
13

See E. Norman Veasey, The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a New Legal Discipline, 48 Bus. L. 1267
(1993).
14
See Mary O'Sullivan, Corporate Governance and Globalization, 570 Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 153, 154 (2000).
15
World Bank, World Bank Development Report : Building Institutions for Markets (2002), at 68, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/2001/fulltext/fm.pdf
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Corporate governance is defined as a system of rules that determines the control and direction of
the corporation and the power allocation among shareholders, directors and officers in order to
maximize the shareholder values and stakeholders rewards as well. This definition has been
central to public policy discussions about corporate governance in the U.S. and some
international organizations.

In sum, “corporate governance” refers to structures and processes by which companies are
directed and managed and the accountability of directors and management is thus stressed. It is
also meant to solve the principle-agent problems in the case of a company, that is, how the
owners (shareholders) as principles can make sure in the lowest cost that their agents (managers)
will act in their best interests.

In the U.S., corporate governance issues have been a topic of discussion for the past 40 years. In
particular, some U.S. organizations like the Business Roundtable, the Conference Board’s
Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprises, and pension funds like California Public
Employees’ Retirement System have adopted their own corporate governance standards or
principles to provide companies a model of corporate governance and to assess the potential
investment opportunities. Such entities and some international organizations like Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) and the World Bank have also
suggested corporate governance reforms and set up principles and best practices of corporate
governance.

These entities are calling for changes in corporate board compositions and

7

structures, especially focusing on the function of independent directors with more effective
oversight over management. 16

Even though theses principles and recommendations presented by such institutions are not
legally binding, they still provide a significant reference for national legislation and regulation,
as well as guidance for stock exchanges, investor groups, corporations and other parties to
achieve a good corporate governance structure. In fact, the recent corporate governance reforms
of the U.S., such as the S-O Act, SEC rules and SROs listing rules have embodied some of the
requirements set out in these principles and recommendations.

16

See CalPERs, Corporate Governance Core Principles & Guidelines (1998), available at http://www.calpersgovernance.org/principles/domestic/us/page01.asp.
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Chapter III
Corporate Governance in the United States
A. Regulatory Scheme
1. State Corporation Law
In the U.S., which has a federal legal system, each state has its own corporation code. Though
each state code might have a high degree of similarity, they are not identical. Hence, U.S.
corporations are governed and regulated mainly by state corporation law with federal law in a
supporting role. 17 Only if the financing of the corporation is in connection with public offering
of securities, must the corporation comply with both federal and state laws. 18

Generally, state corporation law is the principal law for corporations, setting regulations from the
establishment to the dissolution of a corporation, including interior structures and functions of a
corporation, the relationship between shareholders, board of directors, and officers, and their
rights, authorities, responsibilities, and duties. In addition, judicial decisions by different state
courts have also developed some important legal doctrines governing corporate activates, such as
"the business judgment rule" and the “fiduciary duty” of corporate officers and directors to the
corporations.

17

Rocert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law, and Federal Regulation,
38, wake, Forest L, Rev. 961, 961, (2003).
18
Charles R.T. O’Kelly & Robert B. Thompson, Corporations and Other Business Associations, 175 (4th ed. 2003).

9

Pursuant to the corporation code of Delaware 19 and the Model Business Corporation Act, all
corporate power is exercised by or under the direction of the board of directors, 20 and
shareholders do only three things: vote, sell, or sue. 21 Theoretically, shareholders can exercise
ultimate control over the board and the management through directors’ elections and removals.
They also can resolve major issues of corporations initiated by the board. While in reality, as
shareholders have to act through collective action, individual shareholders, and especially
minority shareholders have often been unable to exert their shareholders rights effectively. 22

Given the complexities of a corporation’s day-to-day activities and the inefficiency of directors
overseeing daily operations of business, officers, as agents of the corporations, exercise the most
important corporate powers. Nevertheless, in legal theory they are clearly subordinate to the
board of directors and are barely mentioned in most corporate statutes. 23 Hence, in practice, the
boards’ primary function has turned to be selection, engage ment and replacement of officers,
namely monitoring management’s action.

As stated, U.S. corporations basically are governed by state laws. Regarding the debates of
whether corporate governance should be a federal or state function, federal government until
now did not choose to pass a federal corporate statute that would have federalized the

19

Delaware is the home state of about 60 percent of the Fortune 500 companies in the U.S.
See, eg., Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 141(a)(1999) (all corporate power to be exercised by or under the direction of
the board of directors).
21
See Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to
Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 215, 216 (2000).
22
With the increasing concentration of the institutional investors ’ holdings, however, stockholders may be gaining a
renewed influence.
23
The corporation statutes defer almost completely to a corporation’s bylaws or board resolutions as to what officers
might do, how they are chosen, and how vacancies are filled, except for minimal default provisions.
20
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corporation laws. 24 However, with the enactment of the S-O Act and accompanying SEC rules,
some might think we are now in a federalism crisis 25 and fear significant federal intrusion into
the state law area. 26 Most of the reason for the fear is because the S-O Act is not like other
federal securities laws which mainly address the mandatory disclosure requirements. The S-O
Act also addresses the interior structures and function mechanisms of companies, such as audit
committees, interior and disclosure controls, and prohibited acts of directors and officers, which
are usually the core of the governance system regulated by state laws.

However, there may be some explanation for some states’ inactiveness in facing such dramatic
regulatory changes both in federal regulations and SROs rules of corporate governance since
2002. One explanation may be that the recent corporate scandals are so specific to the unique
characteristics that there is no need to change the state law dramatically. 27 Besides, though the
S-O Act, the SEC rules, and even the SROs’ listing standards may largely influence the U.S.
corporate governance structures and bring huge challenges to state laws, they are not dominant
and eventually not a replacement of state laws either. State corporation laws will still govern the
basic structure of corporate governa nce and continue to evolve.

2. Federal Regulation
Since the 1930s, federal laws concerning corporate governance are in the supporting status while
state laws are in the leading role as stated before. Unlike state laws, federal laws focus mainly

24

Supra note 18, at 197.
See William B. Chandler, III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance
System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. (2003).
26
See E. Norman Veasey, Corporate Governance and Ethics in the Post-Enron Worldcom Environment, 38 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 839, 848. (2003).
27
See Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law, and Federal
Regulation, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 961, 966, (2003).
25
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on the functioning of capital markets, addressing disclosure obligations upon public companies
whose securities are offered, sold, or traded in the U.S. securities market. From the late 1970s,
the SEC began to set normative standards for corporate governance through its disclosure
requirements. It requires disclosures regarding whether issuers have standing audit, nominating
or compensation committees. Besides, companies subject to the proxy rule of Section 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are required to disclose in the proxy statement when directors
are to be elected, (i) if the company has an audit committee, (ii) the names of each audit
committee member, (iii) the number of audit committee meetings held, and (iv) the functions
performed by the committee. With major federal regulatory changes since 2002, however,
federal laws now provide more corporate governance structure norms than ever. Some even say
that federal law now occupies the largest part of the legal corporate governance infrastructure in
the twenty- first century. 28

In short, though there is no fundamental change in the legal principles applicable to the duties
and responsibilities of board of directors and officers in the S-O Act, 29 it specifies new and
broader responsibilities of officers, particularly the chief executive officer (“CEO”) and the chief
financial officer (“CFO”) of public companies. For example, these officers must certify financial
statements, which are also checked by the company’s internal and disclosure control system to
ensure an accurate result. 30 Besides the emphasis on officers, the S-O Act also includes
provisions specifying the structures and compositions of audit committees and the qualification
28

See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon
Federalism, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 859, 861-62 (2003).
29
The S-O Act does not change the business judgment rule or other fundamental tenets of corporation law
applicable to boards of directors and officers. For example, directors can continue to rely on statutory exculpation
from personal liability for breaches of the duty of care if it is provided in the charter pursuant to Section 102(b)(7) of
the Delaware Corporation Code and other similar statutes in other states.
30
See supra note 5, §401(a)(i). This followed SEC action pursuant to its investigatory powers that required top
officers of almost 1000 companies to certify their financial results.
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and role of independent directors. Moreover, like past federal regula tions used a mandatory
disclosure system as a traditional mechanism to regulate corporate governance, the S-O Act also
takes it as a significant method of regulation.

3. SROs Rule
There were stock exchanges before enactment of state corporation codes and federal securities
laws. 31 Though corporate governance of listed companies was not the central part of securities
exchanges’ function in their early era, which was to attract and protect investors, it is required
that listed companies issue financial statements and earning report periodically in the first place.

In 1998, the NYSE and the NASD sponsored a committee to study the effectiveness of audit
committees. This committee became known as the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees ("Blue Ribbon Committee"). In its 1999 report,
the Blue Ribbon Committee recognized the importance of audit committees and issued ten
recommendations to enhance their effectiveness. 32 In response to these recommendations, the
NYSE and the NASD as well as other exchanges revised their listing standards, requiring listed
firms to have audit committees composed mostly or exclusively of independent directors. 33

In February 2002 in light of several high-profile corporate failures, the SEC's Chairman at that
time requested that the NYSE and the NASD, as well as other exchanges, review their listing
31

The NYSE traces its origins to 1792. See Stuart Banner, Anglo-American Securities Regulation, Cultural and
Political Roots, 1690-1860, 250-51 (1998).
32
See Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate
Audit Committees (February 1999). The Blue Ribbon Committee Report is available at www.nyse.com.
33
See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 42233 (December 14, 1999), 64 FR 71529 (December 21, 1999)
(NYSE); 42231 (December 14, 1999), 64 FR 71523 (December 21, 1999) (NASD); 42232 (December 14, 1999), 64
FR 71518 (December 21, 1999) (American Stock Exchange); and 43941 (February 7, 2001), 66 FR 10545 (February
15, 2001) (Pacific Exchange).
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standards with an emphasis on all listing standards concerning corporate governance. 34 After
reviewing their listing standards about corporate governance, the NYSE and the NASD, through
Nasdaq, filed corporate governance reform proposals and amendments with the SEC. 35 For
example, the NYSE amended Section 303(A) of the NYSE’s Listed Company Manual to
implement significant changes of corporate gove rnance (NYSE Corporate Governance Proposal).
The Nasdaq amended NASD Rule 4200 and 4350(c) and (d) to modify requirements relating to
board independence and independent committees (Nasdaq Independent Director Proposal). It
also amended NASD Rule 4350(b) to add a requirement for issuers to announce publicly any
audit opinions with going concern qualifications (Nasdaq Going Concern Proposal), NASD Rule
4350(h) to require an issuer’s audit committee or another independent body of the board of
directors to approve related party transactions (Nasdaq Related Party Transactions Proposal),
NASD Rule 4350(a) to require foreign issuers to disclose any exemptions they may receive from
Nasdaq’s corporate governance listing standards (Nasdaq Issuer Applicability Proposal), and
NASD Rule 4350(n) to require listed companies to adopt a code of conduct for all directors,
officers, and employees (Nasdaq Code of Conduct Proposal). On November 4, 2003, the SEC
approved the NYSE and Nasdaq proposals as well as amendments listed above. 36

In reality, the NYSE and Nasdaq corporate governance rules are as important, if not more
important, as any provisions in the S-O Act and the SEC rules. These new adopted listing rules
have made listed companies review and modify their interior corporate governance structures.

34

See SEC Press Release No. 2002-23.
See SEC Release File Nos. SR-NYSE-2002-33, SR-NASD-2002-77, SR-NASD-2002-80, SR-NASD-2002-138,
SR-NASD-2002-139, SR-NASD-2002-141.
36
See SEC Release No. 34-48745.
35
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B. Summary of New Corporate Governance Requirement
The S-O Act and accompanying corporate governance rules adopted by the SEC, the NYSE, and
the Nasdaq have generally imposed new wide-range requirements of corporate governance in the
U.S., requiring public companies (or listed companies) to step back and analyze their entire
corporate governance structure to meet the newly enacted regulatory requirements.

The following subchapter is not a complete summary of the new legislation but an overview of
some major and influential requirements. It is important to note that the S-O Act applies to
public companies whose securities are registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, companies required to file reports under Section 15(d) of that Act, or companies
that file or have filed registration statement s that have not yet become effective under the
Securities Act of 1933, which have not yet been withdrawn. 37 Whereas, if a public company is
also a NYSE or Nasdaq listed company, it also has to observe NYSE or Nasdaq standards.

1. Independent Directors
To strengthen the oversight function of the board, to have a majority of independent directors on
the board, 38 to tighten and narrow the definition of ind ependent directors, 39 and to require the
board to affirmatively determine that directors are independent 40 are the emphases and the most
focal points of the new legislation.

37

See Supra note 5, § 2(7).
See NYSE rule Section 303A(1); NASD Rule 4350(c)(1).
39
See NYSE rule Section 303A(2)(b); NASD Rule 4200(a)(15).
40
See NYSE rule Section 303A(2)(a); NASD Rule 4350(c)(1).
38

15

However, the S-O Act does not specifically address the role and authority of independent
directors except in the context of the audit committee. There are also different definitions and
criteria to “independent directors” in the new legislation.

a. Independence of Majority of Board Members
In the new legislation, the NYSE and the Nasdaq rules require each listed company to have a
majority of independent directors on its board, though the S-O Act doesn’t affirmatively require
each public company to have a majority of independent directors on its board. 41

b. Definition of Independence
Under Section 301(3)(B) of the S-O Act, every audit committee member must be “independent ”.
The criteria of “independence” of directors under the S-O Act prohibit directors from accepting a
consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the company other than director and
committee fees and from being affiliated persons of the company or its subsidiaries.

But for listed companies of national securities exchanges, SEC Rule 10A-3 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Rule 10A-3”) provides that it is prohibited for independent directors to
“directly or indirectly” accept a compensatory fee from the company. Unless the securities
exchanges rules provide otherwise, however, compensatory fees do not include the receipt of
fixed amounts of compensation und er a retirement plan (including deferred compensation) for
prior service with the listed company (provided that such compensation is not contingent in any
way on continued service). Nevertheless, Rule 10A-3 also provides that it would not preclude

41

See NYSE rule Section 303A(1); NASD Rule 4350(c)(1).
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independence on the basis of ordinary course commercial business relationships between the
company and an entity with which a director had a relationship.

As for NYSE and Nasdaq rules, they emphasize both corporate self- governance and disclosure
with respect to the independence of directors. The boards should first affirmatively determine
that the independent director has no material relationship with the company (either directly or as
a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a relationship with the company) and
then disclose the basis for such determination of independence in its annual proxy statement or in
the annual report on Form 10-K filed with SEC.

In order to provide clarity to investors and listed companies and to facilitate uniform application
of the rules, NYSE rule Section 303A(2)(b) and NASD Rule 4200(a)(15) respectively set up a
bright line test to determine “independence” of the directors, such as the relationship of
employment, receiving in excess of amount of compensation or payment from the company.
However, to be more flexibly applied, some suggest that it should be designed as a rebut table
presumption, rather than a bright line rule. 42

Since the concern of “independence” is to be separated from management, the S-O Act, NYSE,
and Nasdaq rules do not disqualify independent directors from stock ownership of even a
significant amount of stock. 43 However, none of them explicitly recognize or encourage stock
ownership by independent directors. Nevertheless various non-government entities have called

42

See Letter from Charles M. Nathan, Committee on Securities Regulation of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, to Secretary, the SEC, dated April 25, 2003.
43
See commentary to NYSE rule Section 303A(2)(a) and NASD Rule 4200 Interpretive Materials
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for further governance reforms of the recognition of the importance of stock ownership of
independent directors as an incentive to exercise their objectivity. 44

c. Separate Meetings of Non-management Directors
In order to improve the independence and objectivity of the board, NYSE and Nasdaq rules
require the non- management directors to meet at regularly scheduled executive sessions without
management. 45 However, this may create some problems. First, without critical information
available to management, decisions made by the non- management directors may not be informed
decisions and could be harmful to the company or not in its best interests, thus raising liability
issues. 46 Besides, what is the difference and relationship between no n-management director
meetings and the meetings of audit and other committees? Once non- management directors
make a resolution or recommendation and submit it to the boards, is there any restriction to the
boards to accept the resolution made by the non- management directors?

2. Audit Committee
Even though some empirical studies have shown that the presence of an audit committee does
not effectively affect and prevent the likelihood of accounting fraud, 47 one of the most significant
aspects of the S-O Act is requirement of an audit committee comprised of only independent
directors and the expansion of the functions and responsibilities of the audit committee.
However, it is not mandatory under the S-O Act to require each public company to establish an

44

See Charles M. Elson and Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate Governance Reform, 38 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 855, 881, (2003).
45
See Commentary to NYSE rule Section 303A(3); NASD Rule 4350(c)(2).
46
See Letter from Charlotte M. Bahin, Senior Vic President, Regulatory Affairs, America’s Community Bankers, to
Jonathan G. Katz. Secretary, Commission, dated May 8, 2003.
47
See Mark S. Beasley, An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director Composition and
Financial Statement Fruad, 71 Acct. Rev. 443 (October 1996).
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audit committee of the board. Under Section 2(a)(3) of the S-O Act, if no audit committee exists
in the company, the entire board would be deemed as the audit committee.

However, with respect to listed companies, it is mandatory to set up an audit committee of the
board. Section 301 of the S-O Act explicitly provides that the SEC should direct the national
securities exchanges and national securities associations to prohibit the listing of any security of
an issuer that does not have an audit committee composed solely of independent directors. In
words, securities exchanges would de-list companies, which do not satisfy the S-O Act’s audit
committee requirements.

Under the new legislation, the audit committee would be given new responsibilities and duties,
including actively involvement in the accounting decision- making and processes, appointment
and oversight of the outside auditors, and approval of both audit and non-audit services provided
by outside auditors. At the same time, the committee would be given additional resources, like
funding from companies to access outside counsels. The following discusses the composition,
qualification, responsibilities and duties of an audit committee and its members under the new
legislation.

a. Composition
i. Minimum number of members
Pursuant to NYSE rule Section 303A(6) and (7) and NASD Rule 4350(d), each listed company
must have a minimum three-person audit committee, composed entirely of independent directors.
ii. Audit Committee Charter
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NYSE rule Section 303A(7)(c) and NASD Rule 4350(d) also require that each audit committee
have a written audit committee charter that addresses the committee’s purpose and an annual
performance evaluation of the audit committee. The duties and responsibilities of the audit
committee at minimum must include those set out in Rule 10A-3(b)(2), (3), (4), and (5), and
other requirements set forth in NYSE or Nasdaq rules. 48
iii. Separate Meetings
In order to help perform oversight functions of the audit committee more effectively, NYSE rule
Section 303A(7)(c)(iii)(E) requires the audit committee to meet separately and periodically with
management, with internal auditors and with independent auditors.

b. Qualification of Membership
i. Independent Director
Under Section 301 of the S-O Act and Rule 10A-3(b)(1)(i), all members of audit committees
must be independent directors. In addition, NYSE rule Section 303A(7)(b) and NASD Rule
4350(d)(2) also require listed companies to have an audit committee with members that satisfy
the requirements of independence stipulated in Rule 10A-3 and their own listing standards.

ii. Financial Literacy and Financial Expert
NYSE rule Section 303A(7)(a) and NASD Rule 4350(d)(2) require that each member of the
audit committees of listed companies must be financial literate, as interpreted by the company’s
board in its business judgment, or must become financial literate within a reasonable period of
time after his or her appointment to the audit committee.

NASD Rule 4350(d)(2) further

provides that “financial literate” includes being “able to read and understand fundamental
48

See NYSE rule Section 303A(7)(c); NASD Rule 4350(d).
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financial statements, including a company’s balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow
statement.”

With respect to a financial expert, neither the S-O Act nor the SEC rules compulsorily require
members of audit committees to be financial experts. However, Section 407 of the S-O Act
requires companies to disclose in their annual reports, whether, or if not the reasons therefore,
the audit committee is comprised of at least one member, who is a financial expert as defined in
the S-O Act and the SEC rule s. 49 The SEC rules further require the companies to disclose the
name of the audit committee financial expert and affirm that the expert is independent of
management, as determined by the company’s board of directors, or provide why the expert is
not independent. 50

While under NYSE and Nasdaq rules, it is mandatory to have at least one financial expert on the
audit committee. Under commentary to NYSE rule Section 303A(7)(a), a financial expert has
accounting or related financial management expertise, as the board interprets such qualification
in its business judgment.

Under NASD Rule 4350(d)(2)(a), a financial expert has past

employment experience in finance or accounting, the requisite professional certification in
accounting, or any other comparable experience or background which results in the individual’s
financial sophistication, including being or having been a CEO, CFO, or other senior officer with
financial oversight respons ibilities.

49

See Supra note 5, §407, to qualify as a financial expert “the Commission shall consider whether a person has,
through education and experience as a public accountant or auditor or a principal financial officer, comptroller, or
principal accounting officer of an issuer” sufficient experience. See also SEC Release Nos. 33-8177; 34-47235.
50
See SEC Release NOS. 33-8177; 34-47235.
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iii. Dedication
Recognizing that time and effort commitment would be necessary for an effective audit
committee member’s satisfaction of the demanding role and responsibilities, the commentary to
NYSE rule Section 303A(7) requires that each prospective audit committee member should
evaluate carefully the existing demands on his or her time before accepting the job. Besides, if
an audit committee member simultaneously serves on the audit committee of more than three
public companies and the listed company doesn’t limit the number of audit committees on which
its audit committee member serves, then each board would be required to determine that such
simultaneous service would not impair the ability of the member to serve effectively on the listed
company’s audit committee. Such determination must be disclosed in the company’s annual
proxy statement or in the company’s annual report filed with the SEC, if the company does not
file annual proxy statement.

c. Responsibility
i. Oversight of Outside Auditors
Under Section 301 of the S-O Act and Rule 10A-3(b)(2), the audit committee is directly in
charge of the appointment, compensation, retention and oversight of the work of outside auditors,
including resolution of disagreements between management and the auditor regarding financial
reporting. To carry out the responsibility of monitoring outside auditors, Section 204 of the S-O
Act and Rule10A-3(b)(2) provide that outside auditors shall timely report directly to the audit
committee about all critical accounting policies and practices to be used, all alternative
treatments of financial information within generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP ”)
that the auditor has discussed with the management officers of the company, the ramificatio ns
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and the auditor’s preferred alternative, and any other material written communication between
the auditors and management officers of the company.

And to ensure the independence and objectivity of the outside auditors, Section 201(a) and
Section 202 of the S-O Act also provide that the audit committee must pre-approve both audit
and permissible non-audit services provided by the outside auditors in advance. In practicing,
the SEC suggests that audit committees may establish policies and procedures for pre-approval
provided they are consistent with the S-O Act, detailed as to the particular service, and designed
to safeguard the continued independence of the outside auditors. 51 It is important to notice that
some non-audit services are now specifically prohibited under Section 201(a) of the S-O Act. 52
But for other permitted non-audit service, like tax services, unless they are qualified under the
De-minimus exceptions provided in Section 202, the services must be pre-approved by the audit
committee and be disclosed to the shareholders in periodic reports.

Besides, disclosure is

required by the SEC rule s to investors of information related to audit and non-audit services
provided by, and fees paid to, the auditor in the companies’ proxy statement or annua l reports. 53

In addition to the responsibilities and duties of audit committees with respect to the outside
auditors stated above, NYSE rule Section 303A(7)(c)(iii) also requires audit committees to
discuss the annual and quarterly financial statements with the outside auditors, periodically meet
51

See SEC Release NO. 33-8183; 34-47265; 35-27642; IC-25915; IA-2103, FR-68.
The S-O Act creates the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to oversee the auditing of public
companies. Each public accounting firm must register with the PCABO, and according to the S-O Act Section
201(a), registered public accounting firms will be prohibited from performing certain services to clients, including:
bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial statements of the audit client; financial
information systems design and implementation; appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contributionin-kind report; actuarial services; internal audit outsourcing services; management functions or human resources;
broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services; and legal services and expert services
unrelated to the audit.
53
Supra note 51.
52
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separately with the m, and review with the m any audit problems or difficulties and management’s
response, to make the audit committees better understand the financial situation of the company,.

ii. Establishment of Internal Procedure for Oversight
Under the new legislation, the audit committee has a duty to establish internal procedures to
oversee the corporation’s financial compliance situation. According to Section 301 of the S-O
Act and Rule 10A-3(b)(3), the audit committee must establish procedures for two purposes, one
of which is for receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received by the company regarding
accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters, and the other is for the confidential,
anonymous submission by employees of the company of concerns regarding questionable
accounting or auditing matters.

iii. Other Responsibilities
In addition to the responsibilities of an audit committee stated above, under NYSE rule Section
303A(7)(c)(iii), the audit committee’s responsibilities also include discussing the company’s
earnings press releases, as well as financial information and earnings guidance to analysts and
rating agencies, discussing policies with respect to risk assessment and risk management, and
reporting regularly to the board of directors.

d. Engagement of Outside Counsels
In order to enhance the efficient oversight function of the audit committee, the audit committee
has the authority under Section 301 of the S-O Act to engage independent counsels and other
advisors as it determines necessary to carry out its duties. Such costs to hire counsels or advisors
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will be funded by the company. In this way, the audit committee may obtain adequate and
correct information to make informed decisions without entirely relying on the unilateral
information provided by officers or inside directors of the company.

On the other hand,

independent directors are able to rely on the advice of outside advisors in order to exercise their
business judgment in a manner that they reasonably believe to be in the best interests of the
company and the shareholders. Thus, the right to retain outside advisors by the audit committee
can also help establish a reasonable basis for reliance of members of audit committees as well as
help members carry out their duties.

3. Nominating/Corporate Governance Committee
The S-O Act does not require public companies to establish or address the role or composition of
any other committees of the board other tha n audit committees. However, NYSE rule Section
303A(4) requires that companies must have a nominating/corporate governance committee
composed entirely of independent directors. It also requires such committee to have a written
charter that addresses the committee’s purpose and responsibilities and an annual performance
evaluation of the nominating/corporate governance committee.

NYSE rule Section 303A(4) further provides that the nominating/corporate governance
committee would be required to identify individuals qualified to become board members,
consistent with the criteria approved by the board, and to select or to recommend that the board
select the director nominees for the next annual meeting of shareholders. However, if the right to
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nominate a director legally belongs to a third party by contract or otherwise, the nominating
committee’s selection and recommendation are not required. 54

Under NASD Rule 4350(c)(4), it is not mandatory for Nasdaq listed companies to set up a
nominations committee of the board. However, if set up, the nominations committee must be
comprised solely of independent directors. The rule requires that the director nominees either be
selected or recommended for the board’s selection either by the majority of independent
directors or by a nomination committee comprised solely of independent directors under NASD
Rule 4350 (c).

4. Compensation Committee
In addition to the mandatory requirement of the establishment of nominating/corporate
governance committees in listed companies, NYSE rule Section 303A(4) also requires that
companies must have compensation committees composed entirely of independent directors
directly in charge determining compensation of the CEO, making recommendations to the board
with respect to non-CEO compensation, incentive-compensation plans and equity-based plans,
and reviewing as well as approving corporate goals and objectives.

Like the

nominating/corporate governance committee, it also requires the compensation committee to
have a written charter that addresses the committee’s purpose and responsibilities and an annual
performance evaluation of the compensation committee. 55 Besides, the compensation committee

54
55

See commentary to NYSE rule Section 303A(4).
See NYSE 303A(5)(b).
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would also be required to produce a compensation committee report on executive compensation
and disclose it in the company’s annual proxy statement or annual report filed with the SEC. 56

However, the compensation committee does not have the sole authority to determine the
compensation of a CEO under the NYSE rule. Either as a compensatio n committee or together
with other independent directors (as directed by the boards), the committee would determine and
approve the CEO’s compensation level based on the committee’s evaluation of the CEO’s
performance. 57 Besides, the compensation committee may retain an outside consulting firm to
assist in the evaluation of director, CEO or senior executive compensation.

Whereas the

compensation committee should have sole authority to retain, approve of fees and other retention
terms, and terminate the consulting firm. 58

Unlike the NYSE rule, the NASD Rule 4350(c)(3) does not compulsorily require a compensation
committee of the boards. However, if set up, the compensation committee must be comprised
solely of independent directors. And as for the decision of compensation of the CEO, it requires
that companies have CEO compensation determined by either a compensation committee or by a
majority of independent directors.

5. Responsibilities of Executives Officers and Directors
a. CEO and CFO Certifications
The new legislation focuses heavily on the responsibility of officers, especially the CEO and
CFO to take full responsibility for their companies’ compliance with disclosure requirements and
56

See NYSE rule Section 303A(5)(b).
See NYSE rule Section 303A(5)(b)(i)(A).
58
See commentary to NYSE rule Section 303A(5).
57
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the truth and integrity of financial statements. The requirement of CEO/CFO certification may
enhance companies to engage in better due diligence about their financial statements. The
certification requirements of CEO and CFO under the S-O Act and the NYSE rule are as follows.
i. S-O Act Certification
There are two separate CEO/CFO certification requirements under the S-O Act, which are
Section 906 and Section 302. To distinguish certification under Section 906 and Section 302,
first, it is important to address that certification under Section 906 would be deemed to be
“furnished” rather than “filed” to the SEC, while certification under Section 302 would be
deemed to be “filed” to the SEC. 59 This distinction matters mainly because it would direct
whether the certification would be subject to civil liability under Section 18 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 as a misleading statement, or it would be automatically incorporated by
reference into an issuer’s registration statements, which is subject to civil liability under Section
11 of the Securities Act of 1933.

The certification under Section 906 requires that the CEO and CFO certify, as to each periodic
report containing financial statements, such as annual and quarterly reports that the reports fully
comply with securities regulations and the information contained fairly presents in all material
respects, the financial conditions and results of operations of the company. Failure to furnish the
Section 906 certification would make the periodic reports incomplete in violation of Section 13(a)
of the Securitie s Exchange Act of 1934.

Besides, false certifications may also result in

significant criminal penalties.

59

SEC Release Nos. 33-8124, 34-46427, IC-25722.
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The certification under Section 302 is more extensive than the certification under Section 906.
Following this Section 302 certification requirement, the SEC adopted Rule 13a-14 and Rule
15d-14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, developing the term "disclosure controls and
procedures"60 to make it explicit that the “internal controls” 61 contemplated by Section 302(a)(4)
of the S-O Act are intended to embody controls and procedures addressing the quality and
timeliness of disclosure. The SEC also included this definition to differentiate the concept of
“disclosure controls and procedures” from the pre-existing concept of "internal controls" that
pertains to an issuer's financial reporting and control of its assets, as currently embodied in
Section 13(b) of the Exchange Act and as addressed in Sections 302(a)(5) and (a)(6) and Section
404 of the S-O Act.

With respect to the establishment and maintenance of internal controls under Section 302(a)(4)
and (5) of the S-O Act, the CEO and the CFO must certify that they have designed the internal
controls to ensure that material information is made known to them, ha ve evaluated the
effectiveness of the internal controls as of a date within 90 days prior to the report, and have
presented in the periodic report their conclusions about the effectiveness of the internal controls.
They also have to certify that they have disclosed to the auditors and audit committees all

60

“Disclosure controls and procedures” is a newly-defined term under newly adopted Rule 13a-14 and Rule 15d-14
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, reflecting the concept of controls and procedures related to disclosure
embodied in Section 302(a)(4) of the S-O Act. For the purpose of the new rules, “disclosure controls and
procedures” is defined as controls and other procedures of an issuer that are designed to ensure that information
required to be disclosed by the issuer in the reports filed or submitted by it under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 is recorded, processed, summarized and reported, within the time periods specified in the SEC's rules and
forms. "Disclosure controls and procedures" include, without limitation, controls and procedures designed to ensure
that information required to be disclosed by an issuer in its Exchange Act reports is accumulated and communicated
to the issuer's management, including its CEO and CFO, as appropriate to allow timely decisions regarding required
disclosure.
61

“Internal controls” is a pre-existing term relating to internal controls regarding financial reporting. See American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards, AU §319.
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significant deficiencies and material weakness in internal controls and any fraud whether or not
material that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the internal
controls, and have indicated in the periodic reports whether or not there were significant changes
in internal controls, including any corrective action with regard to significant deficiencies and
material weaknesses.

Besides, under Section 302(a)(1), (2), and (3), each CEO and CFO must certify in each annual or
quarterly report filed or submitted to the SEC that they have reviewed the report, that to their
knowledge the report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact, and that the
financial information in the report fairly presents in all materials respect the financial conditions
and results of operations of the company.

False certifications under Section 302 not only might give rise to liability under Section 11 and
Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, if the periodic report is incorporated by reference
into a registration statement on Form S-3 or Form F-3 or into a prospectus filed pursuant to Rule
424(b), false certifications might also be subject to SEC action for violation of Section 13(a) or
(15)(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and both the SEC and private action for violating
Section10(b) and Rule10(b)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. According to the S-O
Act, false certifications might also result in significant criminal penalties.

ii. NYSE Certification and Notification
According to NYSE rule Section 303A(12)(a), each listed company CEO must certify to the
NYSE annually that he or she is not aware of any violation by the company of NYSE corporate
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governance listing standards. This certification would be required to be disclosed in the listed
company’s annual report to the shareholders or filed with the SEC. In addition, NYSE rule
Section 303A(12)(b) also requires that the CEO promptly notify the NYSE in writing after any
executive officer of the listed company becomes aware of any material non-compliance with any
applicable provisions of this Section 303A.

The effect of the CEO and the CFO certifications under the S-O Act and the NYSE rules is that
the due diligence burden would be shared by key executives who report to the certifying officers
and, in large companies, to even lower levels of executives.

In fact, the SEC strongly

recommended that, corporations each create a committee with responsibility for considering the
materiality of information and determining disclosure obligations on a timely basis. Such a
committee would report to senior management, including the CEO and the CFO, who bear
express responsibility for designing, establishing, maintaining, reviewing and evaluating the
issuer's disclosure controls and procedures. 62 Officers and employees of corporations who have
an interest in, and the expertise to serve on, the committee could include the principal accounting
officer (or the controller), the general counsel or other senior lega l official with responsibility for
disclosure matters who reports to the general counsel, the principal risk management officer, the
chief investor relations officer (or an officer with equivalent responsibilities) and such other
officers or employees, including individuals associated with the corporation’s business units, as
the corporation deems appropriate. The setup and operation of this committee might increase the
effectiveness of internal controls.

b. Forfeiture of CEO/CFO Bonuses and Profits
62

See SEC Release NOS. 33-8124, 34-46427, IC-25722.
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Under Section 304(a) of the S-O Act, if the company is required to restate its financial
statements due to material noncompliance with the securities laws as a result of misconduct, the
CEO and the CFO must reimburse the company for any bonus or incentive or equity-based
compensation received during the 12 months following the first public issuance or the filing with
the SEC of the flawed report, as well as any profits on sales of company securities during that
period. However, the SEC may exempt any person from application of the section as it deems
necessary and appropriate under Section 304(b) of the S-O Act.

Though it provides for the forfeiture of CEO and the CFO bonuses and profits, there is no
requirement under the S-O Act that the misconduct in question be that of the CEO or the CFO.
Hence, on the one hand, this provision may reinforce the oversight responsibilities of the CEO
and the CFO to the subordinate officers in the company. On the other hand, this provision seems
too burdensome for the CEO and the CFO given the near impossibility of monitoring the conduct
of each employee to ensure the truthfulness and completeness of the financial statement despite
the applicable exemptions by the SEC.

c. Loan Prohibition
One of the important provisions in the S-O Act about directors and officers is the prohibition of
corporate loans to directors and officers. It is a provision that was for many years part of state
corporate law, but which has been entirely deleted by the Model Business Corporation Act in the
1988 revision. But the S-O Act has now brought it back. 63

63

See supra note 5, §402; 1 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 47, at 950-53 (2d ed. 1971) (describing the 1969 Model
Act and earlier state law); 2 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann., §8.60, at 8-396 (3d ed. Supp. 2002) (describing thirty –four
jurisdictions that continue to prohibit loans to directors and/or officers or allow them in limited circumstances).
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According to Section 402 of the S-O Act, companies are prohibited from directly or indirectly,
including through any subsidiary, extend ing or maintaining credit, arranging for the extension of
credit, or renewing the extension of credit, in the form of a personal loan to or for any director or
executive officer (or equivalent thereof) of the corporation.

This requirement essentially

eliminates all personal loans to directors and officers. Numerous questions arise accompanying
the application to this provision, since this prohibition of personal loans might include various
transactions which are now going on, such as the cashless exercise of stock options, split dollar
life insurance, advances of director and officer indemnification expenses pursuant to charter,
bylaw or contractual provisions, travel advances, personal use of company credit cards,
relocation payments, deferred compensation, leveraged co- investments, loans from 401(k) plans,
and forgiveness of grandfathered loans. 64

However, under Section 402(a) of the S-O Act, there are some exceptions to such prohibition of
personal loans. For example, Section 402(a) does not exclude any home improvement and
manufactured home loans, consumer credit under an open end credit plan, or a charge card or
any extension of credit by a broker or dealer registered under Section 15 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to an employee of that broker to buy, trade, or carry securities that is
permitted under the rules or regulations of the Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System
pursuant to Section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that is: (i) made or provided in the
ordinary course of the consumer credit business of such issuer; (ii) of a type that is generally
made available by such issuer to the public; (iii) made by such issuer by market terms, or terms

64

Robert C. Schwenkel, The Post-Enron Corporate Governance Environment: Where Are We Now, 1377 PLI/ Corp
11, 116 (2003).
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that are no more favorable than those offered by the issuer to the general public for such
extension of credit.

d. Temporarily Freeze Authority
Section 1103 of the S-O Act gives the SEC the authority to petition a federal district court for a
temporary order to freeze payments (whether compensation or otherwise) to directors, officers,
partners, controlling persons, agents or employees of a company that appear to be
“extraordinary” if there is an ongoing lawful investigation involving possible violation of the
federal securities laws by the company or those persons. The temporary order will require the
company to escrow, subject to court supervision, those payments in an interest-bearing account
for 45 days.

6. Financial Disclosure
a. Financial Reports
Section 401(a) of the S-O Act requires each financial report, which contains financial statements
and that is required to be prepared in accordance with (or reconciled to) GAAP and filed with the
SEC reflect all material correcting adjustments identified by outside independent auditors.

b. Off-Balance Sheet Transactions
Section 401(a) of the S-O Act requires companies to disclose in their annual and quarterly
reports all material off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements, obligations (including
contingent obligations), and other relationships of the companies with unconsolidated entities or
other persons that may have a material current or future effect on the financial condition, changes
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in the financial condition, results of operations, liquidity, capital expenditures, capital resources,
or significant components of revenue or expenses.

And the SEC, pursuant to Section 401, adopted amendments to the rules 65 with respect to
disclosure of off-balance sheet arrangements in a separately cautioned subsection of the
Management’s Discussion and Analysis (“MD&A”) section of SEC filings. 66 In sum, companies
must include in the MD&A a discussion of off-balance sheet arrangements 67 that have or are
reasonably likely to have a current or future effect on the registrant’s financial condition,
changes in financial condition, revenues or expenses, results of operations, liquidity, capital
expenditures or capital resources that are material to investors.

In addition, the SEC rule also requires disclosure of contractual obligations in tabular format in
the MD&A to disclose (i) long-term obligations, (ii) capital leased obligations, (iii) operating

65

The SEC adopted amendments to Item 303 of Regulation S-K, Item 303 of Regulation S-B, Item 5 of Form 20-F
and General Instruction B of Form 40-F under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

66

See SEC Release Nos. 33-8182; 34-47264; FR-67 International Series Release No. 1266 File No. S7-42-02.

67

The definition of "off-balance sheet arrangement" primarily targets the means through which companies typically
structure off-balance sheet transactions or otherwise incur risks of loss that are not fully transparent to investors. For
example, in many cases, in order to facilitate a transfer of assets or otherwise finance the activities of an
unconsolidated entity, a company must provide financial support designed to reduce risks to the entity or other third
parties. That financial support may assume many different forms, such as financial guarantees, subordinated retained
interests, keepwell agreements, derivative instruments or other contingent arrangements that expose the registrant to
continuing risks or material contingent liabilities. To appropriately capture these transactions, the definition of "offbalance sheet arrangement" includes any contractual arrangement to which an unconsolidated entity is a party, under
which the registrant has: (i) any obligation under certain guarantee contracts; (ii) a retained or contingent interest in
assets transferred to an unconsolidated entity or similar arrangement that serves as credit, liquidity or market risk
support to that entity for such assets; (iii) any obligation under certain derivative instruments; and (iv) any obligation
under a material variable interest held by the registrant in an unconsolidated entity that provides financing, liquidity,
market risk or credit risk support to the registrant, or engages in leasing, hedging or research and development
services with the registrant. See SEC Rule Release Nos. 33-8182; 34-47264; FR-67; International Series Release No.
1266.
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lease obligatio ns, (iv) purchase obligations, and (v) other long-term debt liabilities reflected on
the company’s balance sheet under GAAP. Such table of contractual obligations must be
included in registration statements, annual reports, and proxy or information statements that are
required to include financial statements.

c. Pro Forma Financial Information
Section 401(b) of the S-O Act requires that pro forma financial information included in the
reports filed with the SEC or in any public disclosure or press or other release be presented so as
not to contain an untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the pro forma financial information not misleading.

In addition, pro form

financial information must be reconciled with the financial condition and results of operations of
the company under GAAP.

d. Non-GAAP Financial Measure Disclosure
Pursuant to Section 401 (b) of the S-O Act, the SEC adopted new disclosure regulation
“Regulation G,” amendments to Item 10 of Regulation S-K and Item 10 of Regulation S-B, and
Forms 8-K and 20-F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to regulate the use of “non-GAAP
financial measures,” “adjusted” data, or earnings before “non-recurring charges.”68

Regulation G requires the company to disclose together with any non-GAAP financial measure,
(i) a presentation of the most directly comparable financial measure calculated and presented in
accordance with GAAP and (ii) a reconciliation (by schedule or other clearly understandable
method), which must be quantitative for historic non-GAAP measures and quantitative, to the
68

See SEC Release No. 33-8176; 34-47226; FR-65; FILE NO. S7-43-02.
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extent available without unreasonable efforts for the forward-looking information, of the
difference between the non-GAAP financial measure disclosed or released with the most directly
comparable financial measure or measures calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP.
If the reconciliation to the most directly comparable financial measure calculated and presented
according to GAAP is not available for the forward- looking non-GAAP financial measure, the
company must disclose that fact, explain why it is not available on a forward- looking basis, and
provide any reconciling information that is available without an unreasonable effort.

The

company must identify any information that is unavailable and disclose its probable significance.

Regulation G also provides that a non-GAAP financial measure, taken together with the
accompanying information, may not contain an untrue statement of a material fact or omit to
state a material fact necessary to make the presentation of the non-GAAP financial measure not
misleading, in light of the circumstances under which it is presented.

In addition, the SEC adopted amendments to Item 10 of Regulation S-K and Item 10 of
Regulation S-B to provide additional guidance to those registrants that include non-GAAP
financial measures in the ir SEC filings. The SEC also adopted amendments to Form 20-F to
incorporate into that form the amendments to Item 10 of Regulation S-K.

It adopted

amendments to Form 8-K that require registrants to furnish earnings releases or similar
announcements to the SEC.

7. Insider Trading
a. Accelerated Disclosure of Insider Trades
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Section 403(a) of the S-O Act amended Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
providing that insider 69 trades, including any change in the ownership of securities or purchase or
sale of a security-based swap agreement involving such equity security must be filed with the
SEC and Securities Exchanges (if it is a listed company) within two business days.

Such

statements filed with the SEC must also be made electronically and disclosed on both the SEC
website and the company website by the end of business day following the disclosure filing.

Pursuant to Section 403(a) of the S-O Act, the SEC adopted amendments to Rules 16a-3, 16a-6,
and 16a-8, and Forms 3, 4 and 5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to implement the
accelerated filing deadline applicable to the change of beneficial ownership reports required to
be filed by insiders under the new legislation.

b. Prohibition of Insider Trading During Blackout Period
Section 306 of the S-O Act and new Regulation BTU (Blackout Trading Restriction) under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 adopted by the SEC 70 , ban any director or executive officer
from directly or indirectly purchasing or selling or otherwise acquiring or transferring any equity
security during a “blackout period” that temporarily prevents plan participants or beneficiaries
from engaging in equity securities transactions through their plan accounts with respect to such
security, if such director or officer acquire such equity security in connection with his or her
service or employment as a director or executive officer.

69

Insiders refer to directors, officers, and shareholders who are directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more
than 10 percent of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security), which is registered pursuant to
Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
70
See SEC Release NO. 34-47225; IC-25909; File No. S7-44-02.
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The trading prohibition only applies during a “blackout period,” which is defined for U.S.
companies as any period exceeding three consecutive business days during which transactions in
equity securities of such companies are temporarily suspended. Under Regulation BTU, the
prohibition on insider trading during blackout periods would not apply to a blackout period that
affects a plan maintained outside the U.S. primarily for the benefit of persons located outside the
U.S., as such plans are not considered “individual account plans.” In addition, Regulation BTU
does not apply to employee benefit plans that have been approved by a foreign taxing authority
or are eligible for preferential treatment under foreign tax laws.

8. Internal Control Report
Section 404 of the S-O Act requires the SEC to adopt rules requiring each annual report to
contain an internal control report, which states the responsibility of management for establishing
and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting and
contains an assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures for
financial reporting. Accordingly to the SEC revised rules, 71 each annual report must include a
report from management on the company’s internal control over financial reporting. The internal
control report must contain (i) a statement of management’s responsibilities for establishing and
maintaining adequate internal controls over financial reporting for the company, (ii)
management’s assessment of the effectiveness of these internal controls over financial reporting
as of the end of the most recent fiscal year, (iii) a statement identifying the framework used by
management to evaluate the effectiveness of the company’s internal control, and (iv) a statement
that the company’s outside auditors who issued the audit report have attested to, and reported on,
management’s internal controls evaluation.
71

Such attestation report by the outside auditors

See SEC Release Nos. 33-8238; 34-47986; IC-26068
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should be filed as part of the annual report. Furthermore, it is required that management evaluate
any change in the company's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during a
fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
company's internal control over financial reporting.

9. Corporate Governance Guideline
Under NYSE rule Section 303A(9), each listed company must adopt and disclose corporate
governance guidelines.

Each listed company’s website would be required to include its

corporate governance guidelines and the charters of its most important committees.

Each

company’s annual report on Form 10-K filed with the SEC would be required to state that the
foregoing information is available on its website.
The following topics would be required to be addressed in corporate governance guidelines:
director qualification standards; director responsibilities; director access to management and, as
necessary and appropriate, independent advisors; director compensation; director orientation and
continuing education; management succession; and an annual performance evaluation of the
board.

10. Code of Ethics and Compliance
Section 406 of the S-O Act requires companies to disclose in their periodic reports whether they
have adopted a written code of ethics applicable to their senior financial officers, their CFO and
comptroller or principal accounting officer, or people performing similar functions (and if not,
state the reason).
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In addition to requiring the disclosure mandated in Section 406, the SEC amended the rules to
require disclosure as to whether the company has a code of ethics that applies to its CEO. 72
Under the SEC rules amendments, a company has to disclose whether it has adopted a code of
ethics that applies to the company's CEO, CFO, principal accounting officer or controller, or
persons performing similar functions in its annual report. A company disclosing that it has not
adopted such a code must disclose this fact and explain why it has not done so. The SEC rules
specifically indicate that companies may have separate codes of ethics for different types of
officers, directors, and employees.

The code of ethics must include standards reasonably designed to deter wrongdoing and
necessary to promote: (i) honest and ethical conduct, including the handling of actual or apparent
conflicts of interest between personal and professional relationships, (ii) full, fair, accurate,
timely and understandable disclosure in reports and documents that the company files with, or
submits to, the SEC and in other public communications made by the company, (iii) compliance
with applicable governmental laws, rules, and regulations. (iv) prompt internal reporting of code
violation to “an appropriate person or persons ” identified in the code, and (v) accountability of
adherence to the code.

Under the SEC rules, companies can choose between three alternative methods of making their
ethics codes publicly available. First, a company may file a copy of its code of ethics as an
exhibit to its annual report. Alternatively, it may post the text of its code of ethics, or relevant
portion thereof, on its Internet website, provided however, that a company choosing this option
also must disclose its Internet address and intention to provide disclosure in its annual report. As
72

See SEC Release NOS. 33-8177; 34-47235.
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another alternative, it may provide an undertaking in its annual report on one of these forms to
provide a copy of its code of ethics to any person without charge upon request.

In addition, the company is required to make “immediate disclosure” on Form 8-K or via Internet
dissemination (only if it previously disclosed its website address and its intention in its most
recently filed annual report) of any change to, or waiver from, the company's code of ethics for
its senior financial officers within five business days after it amends its ethics code or grants a
waiver.

In addition, this code of ethics can form part of a broader code of ethics that complies with the
NYSE rule of “code of business conduct and ethics” and the Nasdaq rule of “code of conduct.”
NYSE rule Sectio n 303A(10) requires each listed company to adopt and disclose a code of
business conduct and ethics for directors, officers and employees and promptly disclose any
waivers of the code for directors or executive officers. It is important to notice that the waivers
of the code for executive officers or directors could only be made by the board or a board
committee. 73

The code of business conduct and ethics would need to be available on the

company’s website and the availability of the code on the website would be required to be
referenced in the company’s annual report filed with the SEC.

NASD Rule 4350(n) requires each listed company to adopt a code of conduct applicable to all
directors, officers, and employees. The code of conduct must be publicly available and comply
with the definition of “code of ethics” set forth in Section 406(c) of the S-O Act and the SEC

73

See Commentary to NYSE rule Section 303A(10)
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rule. Any waiver of the code for directors or executive officers must be approved by the board
and disclosed in a Form 8-K within five days.

11. Approval of Related Party Transactions
To protect the interests of shareholders, NASD Rule 4350(h) requires that each Nasdaq listed
company conduct an appropriate review of all related party transactions 74 for potential conflict of
interest situations on an ongoing basis. All such transactions would have to be approved by the
listed company’s audit committee or another independent body of the board.

12. Shareholder Approval of Equity Compensation Plan
NASD Rule 4350(i) requires shareholder approval of most equity compensation plans, which
now currently do not require shareholder approval. It requires shareholder approval when a
stock option or purchase plan is to be established or materially amended or other arrangement
made pursuant to which options or stock may be acquired by officers, directors, employees or
consultants, other than warrants or rights issued generally to all security holders of the company
or stock purchase plans available on equal terms to all security holders as well as shareholder
approval for tax qualified, non-discriminatory employee benefits plans or parallel nonqualified
plans and plans or arrangements relating to an acquisition or merger, or inducement grant. It is
important to notice that parallel nonqualified plans and inducement grants still have to be
approved either by the compensation committee or by a majority of the company’s independent
directors. Though this requirement of approval of compensation plan by shareholders could

74

For the purpose of this rule, “related party transaction” would refer to transactions required to be disclosed
pursuant to the SEC Regulation S-K, Item 404.

43

prevent detriment to shareholders, it would result in an increase in companies’ proxy solicitation
costs.
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Chapter IV
The Convergence and the Transition of Corporate Governance Structure
in Taiwan
A. Convergence of Corporate Governance Systems
As stated, there is not just one globally suitable corporate governance model. Adversely, every
jurisdiction would develop its own structure based on its country’s cultural, social, economic,
and legal environment.

Corporate governance systems of the U.S. and some other countries

with Anglo-American legal systems, namely common law systems, are built on the foundation of
a stock market-centered capital market, focusing shareholders’ rights and based on dispersed
ownership. This dispersion of ownership mitigates direct shareholder involvement in corporate
governance and leads to the separation of ownership and management. Corporate governance
systems of Germany and some other countries with Continental European legal systems, namely
civil law systems, rest on a bank-centered capital market, focusing stakeholders’ rights and based
on concentrated ownership. 75

There is a “global convergence of corporate governance” theory, simply put, that globalization
will create competition between companies governed by various corporate governance regimes. 76
Globalization will create competition between the dispersed-ownership model and the
concentrated-ownership model in the corporate governance domain. The dispersed-ownership
model, at the end, will emerge victorious because of the reduction of capital costs.
75

Large

See Ronald J. Gilson, Globalization Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 Am. J. Comp.
L. 329, 329 (2001); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate
Governance and its Implication, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641, 642-43(1999).
76
Coffee, supra note 75, at 642.
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corporations always need more capital to grow and compete in their product markets, and strong
securities markets give these companies more efficient access to capital and support innovations
through direct financing. 77

Of course there is no exception for global convergence theory of corporate governance as a
theory facing contrary views. Some criticize that the dispersed-ownership model is not the most
efficient model of corporate governance. They point out some shortcomings, such as the model
encouraging management to place too much emphasis on short-term gains. 78 In addition, the
monitoring function of management and gaining information about the company is not superior
to the concentrated-ownership model. 79

The most important fact is that “one size does not fit all.” Legal systems, business cultures, and
corporate structures are just too different to have a universal code of best practice applying to
every company. And directly adopting legal structures from abroad is to some extent dangerous
because of potential compatibility risks. 80

The OECD reflects this view in the preamble to its “Principles of Corporate Governance”, where
it states, “There is no single model of good corporate governance.”81 And the Global Corporate
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See Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus
Stock Markets, 47 J. Fin. Econ. 47, 47 (1998).
78
See Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. Pol. Econ. 61, 62 (1988) (discussing the
theory of managerial myopia, which argues that the takeover market puts pressure on management and leads them to
focus more on short-term profits).
79
See Coffee, Supra note 75, at 661 (discussing the argument that blockholders are superior monitors); see also
Jeremy Edwards & Klaus Fischer, Banks, Finance, and Investment in Germany (1994).
80
See Lutz-Christian Wolff & Bing Ling, the Risk of Mixed Laws: The Example of Indirect Agency Under Chinese
Contract Law, 15 Col. J. Asian L 173, 174-75 (2002).
81
See “OECD Principles of Corporate Governance”, Preamble, p. 2. (available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/governance/principles.html ).

46

Governance Forum, formed by the World Bank and OECD, has been debating whether it should
promote developed country governance standards or allow emerging markets to “be scored
against guidelines crafted by them and shaped for their conditions, rather than against standards
they had no role in writing. ”

As a result, nevertheless, we cannot ignore the power of globalization and the growth of
international capital markets towards the shareholder-oriented model. It is also important to
recognize the differences between countries with dispersed and concentrated ownership
structures.

B. Some Major Differences between the Dispersed and Concentrated Ownership Model
Though it is hard to simply sum up every corporate governance system in different jurisdictions
under a “common law system” or “civil law system,” there are still some intrinsic characteristics
and differences between these two legal systems.

1. Board Structure
Firstly, corporation structures in civil law countries are different from the structures set out in
common law countries. Generally, there is a statutory two-tier board structure in civil law
countries. A “Management Board” is solely responsible for the management of the corporation
and a “Supervisory Board” supervises the activities of the Management Board. The Supervisory
Board is a separate monitoring body apart from the Manageme nt Board, with members also
being elected in the shareholder meeting. In some countries like Germany, a Supervisory Board
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even takes charge of appoint ment of members of the Management Board. 82 Since a Supervisory
Board’s task is not to manage, but to monitor the management and operations by the
Management Board and officers, members of the Supervisory Board usually can not
concurrently serve on the Management Board, nor serve as officers or employees of the
corporation.

In contrast, common law countries use a monistic system in which the board of directors serves
both a management and oversight function. However, for large public companies, the board’s
oversight function is addressed more than its management function, mainly because of the
practical impossibility for such directors to exercise day-to-day operation of the company. To
serve the oversight function, it is necessary to have an independent and objective board. Hence,
the corporation would set up several committees, such as audit, nominating/corporate
governance, or compensation committees comprised entirely of independent directors to fulfill
these responsibilities.

2. Shareholder Structure
Shareholder structure might be the most fundamental difference in corporate governance
structure between civil law and common law countries. Most capital obtained by companies in
civil law countries traditionally is not from direct securities markets, but from intermediary
financial institutes. It achieves the existence of controlling shareholder structure, no matter it is
dominated by family groups or banks. While companies in common law countries are more like

82

See Lutz-Christian Wolff, Law as a Marketing Gimmick-the Case of the German Corporate Governance Code 3
Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 115, 117 (2004).
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the shareholder-oriented structure, relying on capital from securities market. This brings about
the dispersed ownership structure and mitigates direct shareholder involvement.

The concentrated ownership structure in civil law countries suggests that minority shareholders
will hardly be able to out-vote controlling shareholders who have a sufficient majority of the
votes, and the ownership and management of such companies would not be separate either.
Besides, the concentrated ownership structure would probably lead to undisclosed related-party
transactions, self-dealing, and insider trading, which are all seriously detrimental to the interests
of minority shareholders.

3. Relationship between Shareholders and Board
The other important difference between civil law and common law systems is that civil law
countries have mandatory corporate governance statutes with a clearly defined division of power
between shareholders and directors. The corporate laws of these countries enumerate exclusive
rights of the shareholder meeting, which cannot be delegated to or appropriated by the board.
Powers not included in this list are assumed to be within the realm of the board’s power.
Shareholders in the common law countries have much more extensive rights to opt out of the
statutory legal rules.

C. Reasons for Convergence
With the needs for more efficient access to foreign capital markets and protection of the interests
of shareholders, there is a strong demand for changes in corporate governance systems around
the world. And, naturally, a corporate governance structure in the U.S., which has strong
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securities markets, has become the object of emulation. Moreover, U.S. institutional investors
hold more than 50% of all listed corporate stocks (about 60% in the largest 1,000 corporations).
The largest 25 pension funds accounted for 42% of the foreign equity held by all U.S.
investors. 83 Thus, U.S. institutional investors have further urged foreign countries without sound
and transparent corporate governance systems to make significant changes in their formal
governance institutions to more closely resemble the U.S. corporate governance system, since
the quality of the corporate governance system of a country is a significant determinant for
capital market development. 84

In addition, with more and more non-U.S. corporations listing their securities on U.S. securities
exchange s to directly raise foreign investment, such foreign private issuers not only voluntarily
comply with the listing agreement with the securities exchange, they are also obliged to register
under Section 12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This registration subjects them to a
host of U.S. securities regulations, though there is some exemptive relief for foreign private
issuer.

It is also worth addressing that companies with access to strong securities markets will have a
significant competitive advantage over companies that do not. Thus, countries would like to
enable their companies to take advantage of the global securities markets by providing them a
legal regime that could adequately protect the interests of shareholders and meet the latest trends
of corporate governance reforms.

83

See James McRitchie , Enhancing the Return on Capital Through Increased Accountability (2003), available at
http://www.corpgov.net.
84
CalPERS has announced a set of general principles-its six General Principles including director accountability to
shareholders’ rights.
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D. Transition of Legal Regulatory scheme of Corporate Governance in Taiwan
1. Overview
It is very late for Taiwan to assume modern notions of corporate governance in comparison to
other Asian countries. For example, Singapore in 1989 had required audit committees. In 1998,
Japan launched its first code of best practice of the Corporate Governance, and Korea had
adopted new listing rules about corporate governance by the Korea Stock Exchange. 85 This
reluctance to assume modern notion may be because Taiwan suffered much less during the Asian
financial crisis in 1997 or because of the Taiwanese government’s strongly interventional
economic policies.

Generally, a Taiwanese company raises capital through both direct financ ing in capital markets
and indirect financ ing, such as bank loans. But capital markets have become an increasingly
important source for obtaining capital lately. 86 Between 1999 and January 2004, the number of
companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange increased from 462 to 670, and the market
capitalization increased from NTD 11,803,524 millions (around USD 347,162 millions) to NTD
13,910,346 million (around USD 409,128 millions). 87 These figures not only show that the
reliance on the capital market to raise funds for Taiwanese companies is stronger than ever, it
also shows the need for the transformation of the corporate governance system to meet the latest
corporate governance developments.

85

See Jamie Allen, Code Convergence in Asia: Smoke or Fire, CGI, 23, 32-35 (2000), available at available at
http://www.gcgf.org/library/speeches/AllenAsiaCnvrg.doc
86
See Rafael La Port et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. Fin. 471, 491-500 (1999).
87
See Statistics of Securities Market, TSE, available at http://www.tse.com.tw/docs/statistics/statisticalF.htm.
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The Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”), which is Taiwan’s securities regulator has
emphasized the importance of good corporate governance structure to public companies and
added more disclosure requirements in SFC rules. But it was not until November 2001 when
Taiwan’s congress passed the amendment of corporate law, when formally established a legal
foundation for a corporate governance system in Taiwan. Based on the revision of corporate law,
the SFC adopted several rules about corporate governance, such as rules adding more disclosure
requirements in public companies’ periodic reports and real time disclosure, as well as rules
setting up the qualification of independent directors and their duties for listed companies. In
addition, Taiwan Stock Exchange (“TSE”) and Taiwan’s computerized over-the-counter market,
also known as GreTai Securities Market, (“GTSM”), adopted best practices of corporate
governance for listed companies. In addition to listed companies, there are also some similar
best practice principles of corporate governance adopted by SROs in Taiwan regulating some
financial institutes, such as securities firms, futures commission merchants, securities investment
trust enterprises, and securities investment consulting enterprises.

2. Corporate Governance Structure in Taiwan
This section includes a brief introduction of securities markets and some issues of corporate
governance structure in Taiwan.

a. Composition of Investors in Taiwan Securities Market
Before introducing the corporate governa nce structure in Taiwan, it is important to note that the
securities markets in Taiwan are not like those in the U.S. or other countries where large
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institutional investors play important roles, by forming a strong lobby for reform. 88 Conversely,
according to the statistics made by TSE in December 2003, only 5.09% of trading volume is
contributed by the foreign institutional investors, 12.75% is from domestic institutional investors,
while 81.55% of trading volume is contributed by the domestic individual investors. 89

With the largest percentage of trading in Taiwan’s securities market contributed by individual
investors, Taiwan’s securities market is a shallow plate market. It is easily affected by market
sentiments and fluctuation, resulting in a high turnover rate of trading. Individual investors
usually lack professional knowledge and have less extensive access to information than
institutional investors. Plus, they are usually minority shareholders of companies, and are more
passive than institutional shareholders in actively overseeing the operation of companies.
Consequently, the transition of corporate governance structure in Taiwan is not based on
institutional investors’ advocacy and pressure as influential shareholders on companies, but on
government ’s strategy making.

b. Interior Corporate Structure
The original corporate law in Taiwan is transplanted from Germany. There is a mandatory
requirement of a two-tier board structure, boards of directors and supervisors in Taiwan. 90 Under
corporate law, Boards are in charge of management of corporations and operation of business,
whereas supervisors are in charge of monitoring the execution of business operations of the
88

Supra note 18,195 (By 1998, institutional investors held about 60% of the shares in companies traded on the New
York Securities Exchange).
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corporations. They have the duty to audit the statements and records prepared fo r submission to
the shareholders' meeting by the board of directors, and to make a report of their findings and
opinions at the meeting of shareholders. 91

c. Family Group Concentrated Structure of Ownership
Looking at the corporate governance structure in Taiwan, it is important to realize that most
Taiwanese companies are small and medium- sized enterprises, and are usually dominated by
family groups.

In fact, one of the prominent features of Asian business landscape is the

predominance of family-run companies. About two-thirds of listed companies and substantially
all of private companies are family-owned. 92

This strong family control over companies usually encompasses overwhelming control over both
boards and supervisors, including decision- making and operation of the business, oversight of
management, and also the agendas of shareholder meetings. 93

Though there are some

advantages of a family-controlled business, such as having a strong leadership and cohesive
management team formed by the family members, there is no denying that there are some serious
downsides that this absolute concentrated power might lead to potential abuses of power,
sacrificing the interests of minority shareholders. And one of the most serious drawbacks is the
lack of effective oversight function to the board and management.

In order to de-centralize this family-dominated, concentrated ownership structure, there is a
mandatory requirement for public companies to disperse of securities in the Securities Exchange
91

Id. Art. 219, Paragraph 1.
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93
Supra note 86, at 502 (stating that family-controlled companies are very common).
92

54

Law and SFC rule s in Taiwan. However, in reality, it is still hard to break up the existing
family-dominated type of ownership structure or to prevent these family groups from utilizing
other nominal shareholders to conceal the holding of concentrated ownership structure.

d. Cross Shareholding
In addition to the family-controlled ownership structure, there is another issue of cross
shareholding by parent and subsidiary companies in the corporate governance structure. Before
the revision of corporate law in 2001, there was no provision prohibiting cross- holding shares
between parent companies and their subsidiaries. Therefore, there was a loophole in the legal
framework, allowing some subsidiary companies to be set up as investment companies with their
main corporate purpose to buy a great deal of their parent companies’ shares from stock markets.
There are two major purposes behind this purchase scenario: one is to manipulate the stock
market by driving up their parent companies’ stock price and the other is to being elected as
director or supervisor of the ir parent companies, allowing parent companies to gain more control
power over boards and supervisors. However, both of the purposes are detrimental to the
interests of minority shareholders.

Thus, the revision of corporate law expressly prohibits the cross shareholding between parent
companies and their subsidiaries. It provides that subordinate companies shall not redeem or buy
back any controlling companies’ shares, nor accept any of them as collateral. In this way, the
revision of corporate law may bring an end to the existing cross shareholding structure between
parent and subsidiary companies in Taiwan.
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e. Legal Person Shareholder
Under corporate law in Taiwan, it is permissible for a legal person (or government) shareholder
“itself” to be elected as director or supervisor, or for the person to designate several
representatives to run for election. The legal person (or government) must appoint a natural
person to act on its behalf, carrying out the director or supervisor’s duties. If the legal person (or
government ) designates several representatives to run for election of directors and supervisors,
they can all be elected concurrently. This difference creates a critical unfairness as the natural
person cannot be elected for several posts of directors and supervisors at the same time.
Moreover, no matter what model the legal person (or government) adopts, once the legal person
(or government) or the appointed representatives have been elected, the legal person has the right
to remove its appointed directors and supervisors and replace them with other appointees at will.
In this way, if the legal person (or government) designates representatives to be elected as
directors or supervisors, the “actual” director or supervisor would not be that natural person but
the legal person (or government). It is also hard to determine and distinguish the attribution of
legal responsibilities of the legal person and its appointees.

Moreover, though there is a prohibition under corporate law that supervisors cannot concurrently
be directors, officers or employees of the corporation, there is no restriction prohibiting a legal
person from appointing several representatives to be elected concurrently as directors and
supervisors. Theses appointees can be irrespectively elected as directors and supervisors even
though they are from the same legal person (or government) shareholder, because they are
deemed different “persons.”
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Hence, with respect to the election of directors and supervisors in Taiwan, one of the serious
downsides, which has not been solved yet by the revision of corporate law in 2001, is that there
is no restriction for several representatives of the same legal person (or government) shareholder
from being elected and serving concurrently as directors and supervisors. Since supervisors in
the corporate governance structure in Taiwan are responsible for the oversight of boards and
management, several representatives beholden to one legal person would lead to an inadequate
check-and-balance mechanism in the corporate governance.

3. Transition of Corporate Governance Structure
As stated, there was an overall revision of corporate law in 2001. This has brought in a major
transition from a concentrated-ownership model towards a U.S. shareholder-oriented and
dispersed-ownership model in the corporate governance system in Taiwan. corporate law in
Taiwan establishes the fundamental regulatory basis for the corporate governance system and
applies to every corporation whether public or private. With respect to public companies, they
must also adhere to Taiwan’s Securities Exchange Law, which focuses on the function of
securities markets, like disclosure and transparency of corporation information and prevention of
securities frauds. Several important aspects included in the revision of corporate law in 2001 are
discussed in the following subsections.

a. The Independence of the Board of Directors and Supervisors
The original corporate law requires that all directors and supervisors must be shareholders of the
company. This election requirement maintains existing major shareholders’ control over the
company, and hinders the independence of the board of the company. Since companies in
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Taiwan are mostly owned by family groups, if independent directors and independent
supervisors can only be elected from shareholders, it is hard to expect majority shareholders not
to expropriate interests of minority shareholders.

Thus, the revised corporate law allows non shareholders to be elected as directors or supervisors.
Though this single revision of the revised article cannot show much of the advocacy of
independence of boards, the importance behind this revision is that it supplies a legal basis for
the SFC or other competent authorities to promulgate rules concerning independent directors and
independent supervisors in public corporations.

And after revision of the corporate law, the SFC soon adopted rules and releases to provide
responsibilities and qualifications of independent directors and independent supervisors in public
companies. TSE and GTSM also amended their listing rules, requiring new listed companies to
have at least two independent directors and one independent supervisor on the boards. However,
without a mandatory requirement of independent directors and independent supervisors by law
levels, the SFC or other authorities cannot require every public company to set up and maintain
independent directors and independent supervisors on the board by rules. Hence, the SFC rules
only suggest public companies voluntarily setting up independent directors and independent
supervisors. As for TSE and GTSM listing rules, firstly, they are only applied to companies
which are new applicants of listing. And there is no requirement for already listed companies to
have independent directors and independent supervisors on the board. Secondly, they don’t
expressly require new applying companies to maintain independent directors or independent
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supervisors after their securities are listed. Hence, there is room for improvement to have a good
effect of independence of board directors and supervisors.

Moreover, without major shareholders’ support, like allocating their votes for the “independent ”
directors or “independent” supervisors candidates, it is almost impossible for a independent
director candidate to be elected.

Accordingly, it is also hard to expect these directors or

supervisors to exert their oversight duties to the best of their abilities and prevent major
shareholders from eradicating the interests of minority shareholders, especially when they are
actually nominated and elected by these major shareholders.

However, there are some imperfections of the requirements of independence of boards and
supervisors in new corporate governance regulations. It might somehow serve to help undermine
the current domination of controlling shareholders over the board and supervisors.

b. The Duty of Loyalty
One of the most notable recent changes of the corporate governance structure in corporate law
was the addition of an express duty of loyalty of directors, supervisors, and officers. Before
revision, the corporate law and civil law had expressly imposed a duty of care on directors,
supervisors, and officers, but there was no express duty of loyalty under corporate law. Even
though the duty of loyalty of directors has been developed by case law in Taiwan, it is still
debated whether the duty of loyalty is nonetheless owed by directors and other fiduciaries. Thus,
the new express duty of loyalty of directors provided in corporate law is an important step
towards increasing the responsibilities of directors and other fiduciaries.

59

But the ultimate

effectiveness of the duty of loyalty still largely depends on how Taiwan courts and scholars
develop and interpret the specific nature and scope of the duty.

c. The Role of Manager
The basis of modern corporate governance structure, the separation of ownership and
management, gives rise to powerful managers since corporations rely on professional managers
more and more. The greater role and increased responsibilities of managers provided in the
revision of corporate law shows that it is placing greater importance on professional managers in
corporations.

First, the new provision provides a company with more flexibility to create whatever
management position, structure, and hierarchy it may require, allowing companies to establish
their own management systems in their charters. Second, the new provision clarifies the
authority of managers to administer the affairs of the company and sign documents on behalf of
the company if provided in the charter of the company or by contract. By expressly allowing
managers to act as the legal representative of the company, the new law indicates the shift
towards increased authority and power for managers. And third, along with the greater power
imposed on managers provided in the revised corporate law, it also comes with the duty of
loyalty in the revised corporate law on managers to prevent abuses and misconduct.

d. Convergence of Corporate Governance Structure
The recent revisions of the corporate law indicate that Taiwan is making a gradual transition
toward a shareholder-oriented model of corporate governance structure. And the revisions of the

60

corporate law also show that Taiwan is now struggling with the family group ownership structure
by bringing in independence of directors and supervisors, the duty of loyalty, and imposing
increased power on managers.

From the revision of Taiwan’s corporate law, we know that several points of the U.S. corporate
governance system ha ve been converged.

These include enhancing shareholder values and

upholding shareholder rights by transforming the ownership structure of the company and by
imposing more responsibilities on directors and supervisors; introducing independent directors
and independent supervisors to provide an outside view in overseeing the operation of business;
and imposing increased responsibilities on professional managers to enhance the separation of
ownership and management.

Besides, under the Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles adopted by TSE and GTSM
for their listed companies, it is advisable to make it a first priority to set up the audit committees
to be in charge of reviewing the accounting system, the financial condition, and major financial
or business transactions, examining internal control system, and assessing and nominating
outside auditors. It is also advisable for listed companies to set up other special committees.
However, these are only optional not compulsory requirements. Thus, it may also reduce the
accomplishment that would have been expected.
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Chapter V
Impact of Changes of the U.S. Corporate Governance on Foreign Private
Issuers Listed on the NYSE and Nasdaq
A. Foreign Private Issuers Listed on the NYSE and Nasdaq
By January 15, 2004, there were 467 foreign private issuers 94 from 50 countries listed on the
NYSE, 95 and the number is growing, not decreasing. There are several reasons for foreign
companies seeking to list their securities on national securities markets like the NYSE or Nasdaq.
One is to obtain more efficient sources of capital from one of the biggest capital markets in the
world, and the other is more important, by listing securities on the U.S. securities market to
increase the credibility and confidence of investors to increase their stock value.

We can see this benefit from companies like China Life Insurance Company Limited, which
holds 45% of the life insurance market in China. It listed its securities on NYSE on December
17, 2003 and on its trading debut the stock price rose 27% in a single day. 96 This benefit is also
shown by Infosys Technologies Limited, an Indian developer of customized software company,
which listed its securities on Nasdaq since March 1999. Since its listing, Infosy’s share price has
risen more than 500 percent. 97 Thus, being listed on the U.S. securities markets voluntarily
subjects the company to more stringent restrictions of corporate governance but also benefits the
foreign private issuers in obtaining more capital.
94

Foreign private issuers, as such term is defined in Rule 3b-4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 means any
foreign issuer other than a foreign government excluding companies with most of their shareholders, officers, assets,
or business closely related to the U.S.
95
See NYSE Complete list of Non-U.S. Listed Companies, available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/forlist040115.pdf
96
Karen Talley, Bear Stearns, E*Trade Gain on Earnings News, December 18, 2003, Wall St. J., at C3.
97
Supra note 85.
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As stated, the S-O Act has been probably the most sweeping piece of reform legislation covering
corporate governance of public companies in the U.S. since the 1930's, and a number of new
reporting and corporate governance requirements are imposed on public companies, which
generally comprises both U.S. companies and foreign private issuers. Although there are some
different treatments and exemptions for foreign private issuers under the SEC and SROs rules,
the S-O Act in the end doesn’t expressly exclude its application on foreign private issuers or
make any distinction between the U.S. and foreign private issuers.

Thus, to follow the requirements provided in the S-O Act, such as the certification requirement
of the CEO and the CFO, the loan prohibition, the audit committee, and auditor independence
regulations and so on will do more than just increase the costs of foreign private issuers to access
to the US securities markets.

It will also raise sovereignty concerns or might conflict or

duplicate with the regulations of foreign issuers in their mother countries.

Accordingly, on December 17, 2002, the SEC held two roundtable discussions on the
international implications of proposed rules on auditor independence and attorney conduct. 98 It
also proposed and adopted releases, providing narrow exceptions or exemptions for foreign
companies. However, because Congress did not specifically provide exceptions for foreign
private issuers in the S-O Act, the SEC has stated that it does not believe it has authority to draft
broad exceptions for foreign issuers from provisions of the S-O Act. 99 Thus, for an existing

98

See Auditor Independence Roundtable and Attorney Conduct Roundtable, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/audindtrans121702.htm.
99
For a discussion of the application of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the SEC’s related rulemaking to foreign private
issuers, see http://www.ffhsj.com/firmpubs.htm.
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foreign private issuer or for one who has not yet been but is considering listing its securities on
the U.S. securities markets, the issuer must make a careful evaluation of and advance planning
for the potential impact of the new corporate governance regulations in the U.S.

B. Impact of New Legislation on Foreign Private Issuer
1. Federal Regulation
As stated, since the S-O Act doesn’t expressly exclude the application on foreign countries, it
doesn’t apply only to the U.S. public companies but also to foreign private issuers. 100 To resolve
such problems arising from the lack of express exemptions or different treatments under the S-O
Act, the SEC made Rule 10A-3 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and in some releases,
expressly provides different treatments for foreign private issuers from the application of the S-O
Act. But unless the SEC provides rules or releases to the contrary, the foreign private issuer
would have to comply with the S-O Act as other U.S. domestic companies. In complying with
the new legislation, the following provisions may require foreign private issuers to pay more
attention to and make some changes in the procedures or internal settings concerning the
corporate governance structure.

a. CEO/CFO Certifications
Section 302 and Section 906 of the S-O Act each require certifications by the CEO and the CFO
of all public companies, including foreign private issuers.

The SEC has adopted rules 101

requiring that the CEO and the CFO certify financial and other information contained in periodic

100

See Gerald S. Backman, Compliance with the New Corporate Governance Requirements, 1363 PLI/Corp 581,
585 (2003).
101
See SEC Release NOS. 33-8124, 34-46427, IC-25722.
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reports filed with the SEC. For foreign private issuers filing annual reports on Form 20-F or 40F,102 the certifications must be included in those annual reports.

Because of the requirement of certifications by the CEO and the CFO, it will necessitate the
establishment, maintenance and regular evaluation of the effectiveness of internal and disclosure
controls and procedures to enable the CEO and the CFO to provide their certifications. Some
companies also have set up committees in charge of the internal and disclosure control systems
or developed sub-certification procedures whereby subordinate officers and employees certify
required information within their areas of responsibility in order to assist the CEO and the CFO
in meeting their certification responsibilities.

Thus, foreign private issuers in complying with the requirement of certifications by the CEO and
the CFO accordingly must start implementing the internal and disclosure controls and procedures
and begin conducting evaluations of such controls, so that the company will have all required
controls and procedures in place and will be fully prepared for the required disclosures and
certifications by the CEO and the CFO at the time of the filing their annual reports on Form 20-F
or 40-F with the SEC.

b. Loan Prohibition
One of the most controversial parts of applying the S-O Act to foreign private issuers is the
requirement of loan prohibition to directors and officers. Under Section 402 of the S-O Act, it is

102

Form 20-F is used by foreign private issuers to either register a class of securities under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 or provide an annual report required under the Act. Form 40-F is used by foreign private issuers to file
reports under the Act after having registered securities under the Securities Act of 1933 and by certain Canadian
registrants.
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unlawful for companies to directly or indirectly extend or maintain credit, to arrange for the
extension of credit, or to renew any extension of credit in the form of a personal loan to or for
any director or executive officer of the company.

As stated in Part III, Section 402 does not expressly define what is a "personal loan" or an
"extension of credit," so the prohibition of loans to directors and officers may also apply to some
non-conventional arrangements.

Thus, in complying with this requirement, foreign private

issuers should conduct a detailed review of all kinds of option exercise programs, employee
benefit plans, and other related arrangements to determine if they involve loans or extensions of
credit.

c. Audit committee and Rule 10A-3
Section 301 of the S-O Act requires all listed companies listed on the national securities
exchanges to have aud it committees comprised solely of independent directors, which has been
extremely controversial in some foreign jurisdictions. Not every foreign jurisdiction requires
companies to have a designated audit committee, though they might have alternative governance
structures that serve similar functions, such as supervisory boards or statutory auditors, which are
as independent from management boards as independent directors. Besides, the requirement that
the audit committee consist only of independent directors might also incur some problems in
some countries like Germany, where the supervisory board must include employees who are by
definition not independent. 103

In addition, the requirement that the audit committee be

responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the outside auditors might also

103

See Robert C. Schwenkel, The Post-Enron Corporate Governance Environment: Where Are We Now, 1377
PLI/Corp 11, 66 (2003).
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incur problems in some jurisdictions like Japan, where the outside auditor would be retained only
by the shareholders. 104

Facing such basic legal-structured contradictions among jurisdictions, the SEC proposed Rule
10A-3 to provide a general exemption for foreign private issuers with securities listed on the
national securities market from audit committee requirements of the S-O Act if the foreign
private issuer meets the following requirements: (i) The foreign private issuer has a board of
auditors (or similar body), or has statutory auditors, established and selected pursuant to home
country legal or listing provisions expressly requiring or permitting such a board or similar body;
(ii) The board or body, or statutory auditors are required under home country legal or listing
requirements to be either separate from the board of directors, or composed of one or more
members of the board of directors and one or more members that are not also members of the
board of directors; (iii) The board or body, or statutory auditors, are not elected by management
of such issuer and no executive officer of the foreign private issuer is a member of such board or
body, or statutory auditors; (iv) Home country legal or listing provisions set forth or provide for
standards for the independence of such board or body, or statutory auditors, from the foreign
private issuer or the management of such issuer; (v) Such board or body, or statutory auditors, in
accordance with any applicable home country legal or listing requirements or the issuer's
governing documents, are responsible, to the extent permitted by law, for the appointment,
retention and oversight of the work of any registered public accounting firm engaged (including,
to the extent permitted by law, the resolution of disagreements between management and the
auditor regarding financial reporting) for the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit report or
performing other audit, review or attest services for the issuer; and (vi) The audit committee
104

Id. at 66.
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requirements of paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(4) and (b)(5) of Rule 10A-3 apply to such board or body,
or statutory auditors to the extent permitted by law.

However, if the foreign private issuer cannot meet these general exemption requirements, there
are still some individual exemptions provisions which may apply.

With respect to the

requirement of independence of the audit committee for foreign private issuer, first, the SEC rule
would permit non- management employees to sit on the audit committee if the employee is
elected or named to the board of directors or the audit committee of the foreign private issuer
pursuant to home country legal or listing requirements. Second ly, it would permit one member
of the audit committee of a foreign private issuer, if he is an affiliate of the foreign private issuer
or a representative of such an affiliate, who has only observer status on, and is not a voting
member or the chair of the audit committee, and neither the member nor the affiliate is an
executive officer of the foreign private issuer. Thirdly, it would permit one member of the audit
committee of a foreign private issuer to be a representative or designee of a foreign government
or foreign governmental entity that is an affiliate of the foreign private issuer, who is not an
executive officer of the foreign private issuer.

Besides, the SEC clarified in Rule10A-3 that in the case where a foreign private issuer has a twotier board of directors, the term “board of directors” means the supervisory or non- management
board. Accordingly, that board could either form a separate audit committee or, if the entire
supervisory or non- management board was independent within the provisions and exceptions of
the rule, the entire board could be designated as the audit committee.
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If foreign private issuers avail themselves of the exemptions under Rule 10A-3, they have to
disclose their reliance on the exemptions and their assessment of whether, and if so how, such
reliance would materially and adversely affect the ability of their audit committee to act
independently and to satisfy the other requirements of the SEC rule. Such disclosure must
appear in, or be incorporated by reference into, the annual reports on Forms 20-F and 40-F as
well as proxy statements or information statements for shareholders’ meetings at which elections
for directors are held.

d. Financial Experts on the Audit Committee
The S-O Act and the SEC rules require disclosure of whether there is any financial expert on the
audit committee in the annual reports, and there is no exception for foreign private issuers.
However, since requiring an audit committee financial expert to possess expertise relating to U.S.
GAAP could further burden foreign private issuers who use home country accounting principles
or international accounting standards to prepare their primary financial statements, the SEC rule
added an instruction to clarify that the audit committee financial expert’s understanding must be
of the GAAP used by the foreign private issuer in preparing its primary financial statements filed
with the SEC. 105 It is also required that foreign private issuers that do not prepare their primary
financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP most include a reconciliation to those
principles in the financial statements that they file with the SEC. Moreover, in conjunction with
Rule 10a-3, it is not required under the SEC rules that a foreign private issuer disclose whether
its audit committee financial expert is independent.

e. Non-Audit Services of Accounting Firm
105

See SEC Release NOS. 33-8177; 34-47235.
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Under Section 201 of the S-O Act, it is unlawful for a public accounting firm to
contemporaneously provide its clients with audit and a variety of non-audit services. As for
permitted non-audit services, including tax services, they may be provided by an accounting firm
if they are approved in advance by the audit committee of the company. The SEC rule also
requires that engagements be subject to detailed pre-approval policies and procedures established
by the audit committee, provided that the audit committee is informed of each service and the
policies and procedures do not constitute delegation of the audit committee's responsibilities to
management. 106

Thus, foreign private issuers should conduct a review of all services provided by outside auditors
to make sure that prohibited non-audit services have totally ceased by the end of the
grandfathered period. In addition, in light of the requirement for pre-approval of all auditor
services by the audit committee, it should specifically pre-approve both audit and permitted nonaudit services provided by the outside auditors.

f. Disclosure Controls
As with the certification requirement stated above, the disclosure controls requirement has
focused on companies’ internal disclosure processes. Amongst which, the CEO and the CFO are
required to assess their companies’ disclosure controls prior to the filing of periodic reports and
publicly disclose the results of the evaluations. This requires the CEO and the CFO to take
responsibilities for disclosure and makes it more difficult for them to disclaim knowledge of their
company’s disclosure.

106

See SEC Release NO. 33-8183; 34-47265; 35-27642; IC-25915; IA-2103, FR-68.
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Under the S-O Act, the SEC has adopted new rules which require all public companies including
foreign private issuers to maintain “disclosure controls and procedures,” which are designed to
ensure that all material information about the business will be known by those individuals
responsible for preparing the company’s public disclosure. 107 Even though the SEC has not
mandated or identified any specific set of disclosure controls, it has recommended, not mandated,
in various releases that the company set up a committee, which could be responsible for
establishing and supervising the company’s entire disclosure process, developing procedures for
funneling information to the committee, and considering the materiality of information and
determining disclosure obligation on a timely basis.

g. Off-Balance Sheet Transaction Disclosures
Foreign private issuers would also have to comply with the disclosure requirements of the offbalance sheet transaction in the annual and quarterly reports provided in Section 401 of the S-O
Act and by the SEC rules 108 about off-balance sheet arrangement disclosed in the MD&A.
Several items in the definition of “off-balance sheet” arrangement refer to U.S. GAPP. In
general, foreign private issuer’s MD&A disclosure should just focus on its primary financial
statements and include a discussion of the reconciliation to U.S. GAPP, if it is necessary for an
understanding of the financial statements as a whole.

However, to identify the types of

arrangements which are subject to disclosure under the SEC rule above, a foreign private issuer
must assess its guarantee contracts and variable interests pursuant to U.S. GAPP.

h. Non-GAAP Financial Measure Disclosure

107
108

See SEC Release NOS. 33-8238; 34-47986; IC-26068.
See SEC Release Nos. 33-8182; 34-47264; FR-67; International Series Release No. 1266.
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As stated in Part III, the SEC adopted a new disclosure regulation, Regulation G, requiring
public companies to disclose or release such non-GAAP financial measures, including in that
disclosure or release a presentation of the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure and
a reconciliation of the disclosed non-GAAP financial measure to the most directly comparable
GAAP financial measure. However, the SEC made a significant distinction that will permit
many foreign private issuers to use press releases and other information without being subject to
Regulation G. 109 A foreign private issuer is exempted from Regulation G if (i) the securities of
the company are listed or quoted on a securities exchange or inter-dealer quotatio n system
outside the U.S., (ii) the non-GAAP financial measure is not derived from or based on a measure
calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP, and (iii) the disclosure is made by or on
behalf of the company outside the U.S. The exceptions above focus on whether the financial
measure relates to U.S. GAAP and whether the disclosure is made by or on behalf of the foreign
private issuer outside of the United States. This is a balance of the interests of U.S. investors and
the interests of foreign private issuers in communicating globally, including in their home
markets.

In addition to Regulation G, the SEC also amended Form 20-F of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to incorporate Item 10 of Regulation S-K, which is similar to but tougher than Regulation
G, to impose requirements concerning the use of non-GAAP financial measures in an SEC filing.
Accordingly, foreign private issuers will be subject to the same requirements as domestic issuers
with respect to the use of non-GAAP financial measures in filings with the SEC on Form 20-F.
However, filing Form 40-F is not subject to those requirements.

109

See SEC Release No. 33-8176; 34-47226; FR-65.
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i. Code of Ethics
Pursuant to the S-O Act, the SEC adopted rules 110 providing that foreign private issuers are
required to disclose in their annual reports on Form 20-F and 40-F whether they have adopted a
written code of ethics that applies to the company’s CEO, CFO, principal accounting officer or
controller, or people performing similar functions, and the changes or waivers of the code of
ethics. However, in contrast to U.S. domestic companies, foreign private issuers don’t have to
provide in a current report “immediate disclosure” of any change to, or waiver from, the
company’s code of ethics for its senior financial officers and CEO. Nevertheless, the SEC
strongly encourages prompt disclosure by foreign private issuers under cover of Form 6-K or on
the foreign private issuers’ websites. 111

2. SRO Listing requirement
a. NYSE Rule
Generally, the NYSE rules do not apply to foreign private issuers. Under NYSE rule Section
303A(11), foreign private issuers are allowed to follow home country practice in lieu of the new
requirements, except that such companies would be required to: (1) have an audit committee that
satisfies the requirements of Rule 10A-3; (2) notify the NYSE in writing after any executive
officer becomes aware of any non-compliance with any applicable provision; and (3) provide a
brief, general summary of the significant ways in which its governance differs from those
followed by domestic companies under NYSE listing standards.

110
111

See SEC Release NOS. 33-8177; 34-47235.
See SEC Release NOS. 33-8177; 34-47235.
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Section 303A(11) also demands listed foreign private issuers to disclose any significant ways in
which their corporate governance practices differ from those followed by domestic companies
under the NYSE listing standards. The disclosure may be provided either on the issuer’s website
(provided in English) and/or in their annual report distributed to U.S. shareholders. If it is only
provided on the website, the annual report must state and provide the website address.

b. Nasdaq Rule
NASD Rule 4350 currently provides that foreign issuers are not required to do any act that is
contrary to a law, rule or regulation of any public authority exercising jurisdiction over such
issuer or that is contrary to generally accepted business practices in the issuer's country of
domicile. Nasdaq rules also provide exemptions from the requirements of NASD Rule 4350 as
may be necessary or appropriate to carry out this intent. Nasdaq also proposes to provide that a
foreign issuer that receives an exemption from NASD Rule 4350 would be required to disclose
in its annual reports filed with the SEC each requirement from which it is exempted and describe
the home country practice, if any, followed by the foreign private issuer in lieu of these
requirements. In addition, a foreign issuer making its initial public offering or first U.S. listing
on Nasdaq would be required to disclose any such exemptions in their registration statement.
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Chapter VI
Conclusion
The importance of good corporate governance structure is the more efficient access to capital for
companies. Since better corporate governance would lead to higher returns on equity and greater
efficiency, it has been addressed around the world. However, it is important to realize that there
is no one perfect model of corporate governance suitable to every country. It would be different
and changed by time, history, and existing legal grounds. But due to the globalization and
integration of financial and capital markets, it seems inevitable for companies to adjust
themselves to the most influential corporate governance model nowadays.

And it also

encourages governments to establish or revise their regulatory scheme s for better corporate
governance structures to maintain investors’ confidence in securities markets.
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